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INTRODUCTION

In the third of a century since it was handed down, Chevron' has
become by far the most widely cited case in U.S. legal history.' This fact
may cause one to view Chevron as an independent phenomenon. Yet
deference doctrine generally and Chevron in particular are better understood
as part of the ocean of administrative law. They are moved by the same
gales as roil that ocean.
Chevron rose in tax over several decades. It is now receding in tax.
King v. Burwell' is part of that recession and may well contribute to its
acceleration.

* University Professor, Florida State University College of Law. sjohnson@lawJsu.edu.
I. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See, e.g., STEPHEN G, BREYER ET AL., ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 247
(6th ed. 2006). The gap has widened in the years since.
3. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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These phenomena are not random. Both the flood tide and the neap tide
resulted from the pull of broader administrative law currents. Chevron's
level rose in tax because of the bankruptcy of tax parochialism, the view that
tax is unique and so should fall largely outside of administrative law rules.
Chevron's level is falling in tax for the same reason it is falling
generally. Administrative law is an ever-shifting balance of practical
expediency and constitutional legitimacy .4 This leaves many administrative
law doctrines with roots too shallow to thrive.
So it is with Chevron. Internal inconsistencies in Chevron have become
more, not less, glaring over time. Chevron was murky from the start and has
become murkier with passing years.' It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a
rising chorus has elaborated Chevron's inadequacies ,6 called for its
abrogation,' and charted its decline.'
I added my voice to that chorus in a 2012 article.' That article noted
that "there appears to be a move afoot to downplay Chevron, not in name but
in fact," 10 and it predicted that, rather than Chevron being expressly
overturned, the likeliest outcome would be that the courts would "continue
to honor Chevron in name but apply it so that, in substance, it is no longer an
independently operative principle of law ."11 Those drawn to honest labeling
might prefer that the Court formally overturn Chevron. But, although the
Court sometimes does overrule its precedents,1 2 its preference is to keep
things fluid, in order to facilitate coalition building and preserve room for

4. E.g., Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action-A Revisionist History,
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 245 (1991) ("[O]ne cannot conclude that there is one ideal and elegant
allocation of power between court and agency where administrative law will necessarily have to
rest.").
5. An excellent report noted: "[T]he degree of deference that federal courts owe to
administrative pronouncements is a vexing issue, one frequently scrutinized by the Supreme Court.
Regular attention from the Supreme Court, however, has failed to produce clarity for administrative
law, in general, or for tax law, in particular." ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on
JudicialDejerence,51 TAX LAW. 717, 719-20 (2004).
6. E.g., Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and
Judicial Review of Agency Regulatioris, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 229 (2008).
7. E.g., Jack M. Beerman, ETUi the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed
and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled. 42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010); Bryan T. Camp.
Interpreting Statutory Silence, 128 TAX NOTES 501, 507 (2010); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical
Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN.L. REV. 567 (1992).
8. E.g., Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey ofChevronfrom Infancy to Senescence, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007).
9. Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX
REV. 269, 280 (2012).
10. Id. at 280-4!1.
11. Id.at283.
12. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 16 GEO. LJ. 1361
(1988) (identifying numerous such cases).
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maneuver in future cases.13 Given this preference, keeping Chevron alive in
name only may be the best reasonably attainable outcome.
Part I of this article sketches the rise of Chevron in tax, culminating in
the Supreme Court's Mayo decision in 2011,14 rejecting tax exceptionalism.
A recurring note is ambiguity-uncertainty as to the reach and meaning of
Chevron.
Part II explores the fall of Chevron in tax. Chevron has receded in tax
because it, at least in its original form, is receding everywhere. Realization
of Chevron's inadequacies is causing the courts to multiply exceptions to
Chevron and to apply it in ways that rob Chevron of its original deferential
nature.
Part ill concludes. It opines that the rise and fall of Chevron in tax do
not represent wasted motion leaving us in the same place as where we
started. Instead, by opening to a wider world of administrative law, tax
practice has the potential to improve. 15
I.

CHEVRON'S RISE IN TAX

A. Before Chevron

Deference issues did not begin with Chevron. In tax and other areas, the
courts have wrestled for centuries with the weight to accord to agency rules
and interpretations .16
These cases instructed that tax regulations should be upheld ''unless
unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes." 17 Thus, in
their verbal formulation at least, the pre-Chevron tax cases remind one of the
deferential part of Chevron: its step two.
13. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802,
817-30 (1982).
14. Mayo Found. for Educ. Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011); see Steve R. Johnson,
Mayo and the Future o/TaxRegulations, 130TAXNOTES 1547 (Mar. 28,2011).
15. For a discussion of the opportunities created for taxpayers by the entry of administrative law
into tax, see Johnson, supra note 9, at 300-25.
16. E.g., Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931) (stating that tax
regulations "are valid unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute''); cf. International Ry. Co.
v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506, 514 (1922) (stating the same as to cost.oms duties the Court called
"virtually [the] laying [of] a tax"). For discussion of pre-Chevron cases outside of tax, see Mark
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
lnterpretatioris of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REV. 83, 87-94 (1994).
17. Comm.'r v. S. Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); see also Manhattan Gen. Equip.
Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (to be valid, a regulation must ''be consistent with the
statute, [and] it must be reasonable"). For discussion of prominent pre-Chevron tax cases, see Steve
R. Johnson, Swallows Holding as It ls: The Distortion of National Muffler, 112 TAX NOTES 351,
362---05 (July 24, 2006).

21

Vol. 2015

The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax
PEPPERDINE LAW REvIEW

The most frequently cited case of the line, National Muffl.er, used the
same general reasonableness formulation. 18 It also distilled prior cases to
identify six considerations potentially relevant to the reasonableness
inquiry. 19
B. Chevron and Its Immediate Aftermath

In 1984 in Chevron, the Court unanimously upheld an EPA regulation.20
Based on notions of expertise, political responsiveness, and delegation, the
Court concluded that Congress usually wants agencies, not courts, to fill
statutory gaps.21 It announced the famous "two step" under which a court
asks first whether the statute is ambiguous.22 If it is, the court asks second
whether the agency's position is at least reasonable."
It was initially unclear whether Chevron applied to all agency actions.
Subsequent cases, most prominently Mead,24 answered the question in the
negative. Mead held that an agency's interpretation "qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation ... was promulgated in the exercise of that authority ."25 Mead
converted the Chevron two step into a three step, the new step (step zero
because it necessarily precedes step one) being determining whether
Chevron applies at all to the case at hand.26
Agency interpretations not satisfying Mead are evaluated under the
Skidmore "standard,"27 which is neither a standard nor deferential.28
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Skidmore "has produced a spectrum of judicial
18. Nat'! Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477-78, 488 (1979).
19. Id. at 477 (rehearsing contemporaneity of the regulation and the statute, the manner of

evolution of non-contemporaneous regulations, the tenure of the regulation, the reliance placed upon
it, the consistency of interpretation, and the degree of congressional scrutiny during reenactments).

20. Chevron, U.S.A.,Inc. v.Natura!Res. Def. Council,Inc.,467 U.S. 837 (1984).
21. Id. at 843-45, 865-66.
22. Id. at 842-43, 865.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
25. Id.at226-27.
26. See Cass R. Sunst.ein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
27. Mead, 533 U.S. at227-28; see Skidmore v. Swift& Co.,323 U.S.134, 140 (1944).
28. According to Skidmore, "[t]he weight [accorded to the agency's position] will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its :reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control." Id.
Ultimately, an undifferentiated "all factors" test is not a test at all. E.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
U.S. 667, 675 n.5 (1982). And, upholding the agency only if the court agrees with "the validity of
[the agency's] reasoning" can hatdly be described as deference. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
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responses, from great respect at one end ... to near indifference at the
other."29

Chevron's domain seemed to expand in 2005 in Brand X, which held
that agencies can often, in effect, overrule judicial decisions. "A court's
prior construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion."30
C. Mayo

Views differed as to whether Chevron did and should apply to tax.31
Some took an understandable but regrettable view that "tax is special; the
normal administrative law rules don't apply to us."32
The Supreme Court had frequent opportunities to settle this question in
the 1980s through early 2000s.
Unfortunately, the Court at first
compounded the confusion rather than dispelling it. In the 1985 Boyle case,
the Court cited Chevron but not National Muffler." In the 1991 Cottage
Savings case, the Court cited National Muffler's general language but not its
six particular considerations and not Chevron." In 1998 in Atlantic Mutual,
the Court cited both Chevron and Cottage Savings but not National
Muffler. 35 In 2001 in Cleveland Indians, the Court cited National Muffler
but not Chevron." In 2003 in Boeing, the Court cited Cottage Savings but
neither Chevron nor National Muffler. 31 In none of these cases did the Court
explain why it applied or eschewed the various precedents.
Nonetheless, it was widely accepted that Chevron did supply the
governing standard when specific authority tax regulations are challenged."
29. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
30. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
31. Among early commentary, see Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax
Regulatioris, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1996); John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and
Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35 (1995); Mitchell M. Gans,
Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731 (2002).
32. For denunciations of such ''tax exceptionalism," see Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas
Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX. REY. 517 (1994); Kristin E.
Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1537 (2006).
33. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985).
34. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r,499 U.S. 554,560-61 (1992).
35. Atlantic Mut. ms. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 387, 389 (1998).
36. United States v. Cleveland Indians B"'°ball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001).
37. Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S.437,448 (2003).
38. E.g., El. du Pont de Nemnurs & Co. v. Comm'r, 41 F.3d 130, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1994); Carlos
v. Comm'r, 123 T.C. 275,280 (2004).
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The majority view was that Chevron also controlled challenges to general
authority tax regulations."
Any lingering doubt was- or should have been-dispelled by the
Court's 2011 Mayo decision.40 Mayo is significant for three reasons. First,
dealing a mortal blow to tax exceptionalism, the Court stressed "the
importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of
administrative action."41 The Court did preface this statement with the
observation that the taxpayer had failed to offer a justification for departing
from the administrative law norm. "In the absence of such justification, we
are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for
tax law only ."42 Taken literally, this might leave an opening for taxpayers to
develop justifications in future cases challenging tax regulations. However,
it is likely that this ship has already sailed.
Second, the Mayo Court made clear that "[t]he principles underlying our
decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context.... We see no
reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency
expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other
regulations.""
Thus, the Court held-and Mayo was decided
unanimously-that Chevron, rather than National Muffler, "provide[s] the
appropriate framework.'...,
Some commentators still urge that National Muffler be resurrected in
whole or in part.45 Life is endlessly surprising. Nonetheless, I expect that
National Muffler will be revived around the time the Romanovs regain the
throne of Russia. Not only was Mayo a unanimous decision, it also-far
from being a radical doctrinal revision-is consistent with ample postNational Muffler precedents. Mayo specifically rejected several National
Muffler factors, such as consistency, antiquity, and contemporaneity .46
Previous cases had done so as well.47

39. See, e.g., Bankers Llfe & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 982 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 961 (1998); Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 96, 180-81 (2006)
(Holmes, J ., dissenting) (surveying the circuits), vacated & remanded, 515 F 3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008).
40. Mayo Found. for Educ.Research v. United States, 562 U.S.44 (2011).
41. Id. at 55 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 55-56.
44. Id. at 57.
45. E.g., Leslie Boodry, Judicial Deference Post-Mayo Foundation: Why the National Muffler
Factors Shoukl Be Incorporated into Step Two of Chevron, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2014); Matthew
H. Friedman, Reviving National Muffler: Analyzing the Effect of Mayo Foundation on Judicial
Deference as Applied to General Authority Tax Guidance, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 115
(2012).
46. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 54-55.
47. E.g., United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 316 (2009) (consistency); Smiley v.
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Third, the Court made clear that the same standard applies to general
authority regulations as applies to specific authority regulations. The
regulation at issue in Mayo had been promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a),
not under a delegation within a specific section.48 The Court noted both preChevron cases stating that specific authority tax regulations receive greater
deference than general authority tax regulations and post-Chevron cases
according deference to general authority regulations.49 The Court stated that
"the administrative landscape has changed significantly" since the preChevron tax cases and that, especially when the regulation has gone through
notice-and-comment procedures,'0 the policies behind Chevron are engaged
no less by general authority delegations than by specific authority
delegations."
However, Chevron does not control when the IRS's position is
embodied in a pronouncement of less stature than regulations." Revenue
rulings, notices, and the like typically are not submitted for notice and
comment and do not have the force of law .53 It is now essentially settled that
the validity of such positions is measured under Skidmore, not Chevron."

Citibank (SD.) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996) (antiquity, contemporaneity, and consistency). The
regulation upheld in Chevron was promulgated years after the statute was enacted, and it reversed an
earlier regulation. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 85758 (1984).
48. For decades, the IRS has been calling general authority regulations '':interpretive regulations"
and calling specific authority regulations "legislative regulations." For decades, they have been
wrong. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Interm.ountain and the Importance of Administrative Law in Tax
Law, 128 TAX NOTES 837, 843-46 (Aug. 23, 2010).
The tax community generally marched under this banner of error. Fortunately, the Tax Court
recently recanted. Altera Corp. v. Comm'r, 145 T.C. No. 3, slip op. at *14 n.10 (2015) (unanimous
en bane opinion). It remains to be seen how long Treasury/IRS will cling to error in increasing

isolation before their inevitable surrender.
49. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 56-57 (citing cases).
50. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012). Use of the notice-and-comment procedures is a "significant"
indication that Chevron applies. E.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551U.S.158, 173174 (2007); United States v. Mead Cmp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001).
51. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 5~57 ("Our inquiry ... does not tum on whether Congress's delegation
of authority was general or specific.").
52. For description of such pronouncements, see DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON &
STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 17-32 (2d ed. 2008); Kristin E. IIlckman, /RB Guidance:
The No Man's I.and of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 242-52 (2009).
53. For an argument that the force of law concept is hard to apply in tax, see Kristin E. IIlckman,
Unpacking the Force ofLaw,66 VAND.L.REv. 465 (2013).
54. E.g., Voss v. Comm'r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015); id. at 1071 (Ikuta, J., dissenting)
(agreeing on this point with the majority); Taproot Ad.min. Servs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. 202,
212 (2009), affd, 619 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2012).

25

The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax

Vol. 2015

PEPPERDINE LAW REvIEW

II. THE FALL OF CHEVRON JN TAX (AND ELSEWHERE)

The Supreme Court considered Chevron in two tax cases after Mayo:
Home Concrete" and King .56 As discussed below, Chevron was of no help
to the ms either time. Chevron still occasionally supports pro-agency
outcomes at the Supreme Court'' and lower court levels." On the whole,
however, the Court has shown itself adept at finding ways to undercut
Chevron.
Below, we first note the "why" of limiting Chevron, that is, the
deficiencies of Chevron that inspire caution about applying the case
robustly. Given space constraints, this endeavor will involve enumeration,
not detailed exploration. Thereafter, we will address the "how" of
limitation, that is, the variety of doctrinal devices courts have used since
Mayo to avoid Chevron or to limit its effect.
A. The Why of Limitation

The complaint most frequently lodged against Chevron involves its
unpredictability, both as to when it will be applied and what results it will
produce when applied." Part of the confusion is the persistent use of
"deference" to refer to both force-of-law regulations and mere non-binding
guidance documents, two different kinds of agency positions .60
But there are deeper problems. Chevron lacks an adequate theoretical
foundation.61 One problem is that the notion of delegation-which, as we
have seen, is a major prop of Chevron-is an unhelpful fiction. 62
55. United States v. Homo Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. a. 1836 (2012).
56. King v. Burwell, 135 S. a. 2480 (2015).
57. E.g.,EPA v.EMEHomer City Generation,L.P., 134S.Q.1584,1603--09 (2014).
58. E.g., Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 61-63 (4th Cir. 2011).
59. E.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 295 (2009)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Thirty Years of Chevron v. NRDC and the Administrattve Law Review: A
Letter from the Executive Board, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 235, 238 (2014) (noting the "strikingly
contradictory Supreme Court decisions which continually led academia to question [Chevron's]
relevance") [hereinafter Executive Board].
60. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 282-83; Cooley L. Howarth Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.:
More Pieces for the Chevron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 699, 701 (2002). But
see Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90
TEX. L. REV. 331, 351 (2011) (noting thst, although they are not legally binding, guidance
documents can have great practical consequence).
61. E.g., Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: Haw Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 673 (2007). For
discussion of the political theory underpinnings of Chevron, see Seidenfeld, supra not.e 16, at 94-

103.
62. See, e.g., Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine of Hard Cases, 66 ADMIN L. REV. 285
(2014); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTREDAMEL.REv. 273, 276-88 (2011).
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Another fundamental problem is the failure of Chevron to deal
convincingly with an old problem. The Vesting Clause of Article I of the
Constitution" confers the lawmaking power upon Congress. Congress
cannot delegate that power.64 The Vesting Clause of Article In«' confers
upon the courts the power to "say what the law is."66 This power too may
not be delegated.67 Why then can agencies create binding law to fill in
statutory gaps, and why will courts defer to agency interpretations that the
courts believe are wrong though not so obviously wrong as to be
unreasonable?68
Various attempts have been made to square the power Chevron
seemingly gives to agencies with these constitutional provisions ,6' but no
durable consensus has yet emerged. Doubts on this score are never far
beneath the surface and have been powerfully voiced by some justices in
recent cases .7°
Such concerns are compounded by the fact that Chevron created a
judicial rule to allocate power when a statutory rule doing just that already
existed. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") includes provisions
governing judicial review of agency actions. It empowers federal courts to
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be ... arbitrary, capricious, [or] in excess of statutory ... authority."71
Yet, in the view of some, "[h]eedless of the original design of the APA, [the
Supreme Court has] developed an elaborate law of deference to agencies'
interpretations," expanding the power of agencies beyond the balance

63. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ I.
64. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531U.S.457, 472 (2001); Wayman v. Southard, 23
U.S.1,42-43 (1825).
65. U.S. CONST. art. ill,§ I.
66. Marbury v.Madison, 5U.S.137,177 (1803).
67. E.g., Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608--09 (2011).
68. E.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'! Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 826 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., writing
for the Court) ("A court must uphold the [agency's] judgment as long as it is a permissible
construction of the statute, even if it differs from how the court would have interpreted the statute in
the absence of an agency regulation.").
69. As to the Article I problem, see J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
410--11 (1928) (noting that the three branches share the various powers, and stating that, when
Congress lays down an intelligible principle to guide the agency, the agency does not make law but
is merely the agent of Congress).
Leading scholars have proposed different solutions to the Article I problem. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (1983); Seidenfeld,
supra note 62, at 289-311; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Puwer to Say What
tM Law ls, 115 YALEL.J. 2580, 2589--98 (2006).
70. E.g., DOT v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring); id. at
1240--52 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2012).
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Congress struck in the APA.72
Underlying these objections is concern that deference doctrine has
abetted fundamental transformation of the American constitutional structure.
"The Framers could hardly have envisioned today's vast and varied federal
bureaucracy and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our
economic, social, and political activities.'"' Deference doctrine, some
justices believe, has been one of the culprits.
Perhaps there is some unique historical justification for deferring
to federal agencies, but [the] cases reveal how paltry an effort we
have made to understand it or to confine ourselves to its
boundaries. . . . [W]e seem to be straying further and further from
the Constitution without so much as pausing to ask why. We should
stop to consider that document before blithely giving the force of
law to any other agency "interpretations" of federal statutes.74
B. The How of Limitation

All of the justices of the Supreme Court have written or joined opinions
expressing the above or other concerns about Chevron. Yet the justices
diverge as to which concerns are substantial and the weight to be accorded
each. As a result, recent cases drain Chevron of vitality through an
accumulation of exceptions rather than eviscerating Chevron with a single
blow. Consider the following four avenues of erosion of Chevron on display
in tax and non-tax cases decided since Mayo.
1. Ignoring Chevron
We have seen that, before Mayo, the Supreme Court sometimes applied
Chevron or other deference doctrines in tax cases and sometimes did not,
without explaining its choices.75 Something similar happened in 2015 in
Inclusive Communities, a non-tax case.76 A community group sued a state
72. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers' Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also id. at 1212 (remarking that this problem is "perhaps insoluble if Chevron is not
to be uprooted"); see also William R. Andersen, Against Chevron-A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN.
L. REv. 957, 972 (2004).
73. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, CJ., joined by Kennedy &
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
74. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., cnncurring) (citations
omitted).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 33 to 37.
76. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015).

28

Vol. 2015

The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax
PEPPERDINE LAW REvIEw

housing agency, challenging the agency's allocation of low income housing
tax credits. As the case was wending its way through litigation, the federal
Department of Housing and Urban Affairs ("HUD") promulgated a
regulation supporting the community group's interpretation of the key
statute, the Fair Housing Act.77 By five to four, the Supreme Court held for
the community group.78
Chevron had no impact on the resolution of the case. The four
dissenters thought the HUD regulation was invalid because it was contrary
to the statute and did not represent HUD's considered view of the matter.79
The majority was even less interested in Chevron. It resolved the case on
the basis of statutory interpretation, without invoking Chevron. 80
2.

Fashioning Exceptions

In 2001, the Supreme Court in Mead carved a major exception out of
Chevron,81 and other exceptions also exist. Two of them were rehearsed in
2015 in the high profile King case, which considered the availability of tax
credits for insurance purchased on federally created insurance exchanges.82
The Court refused to defer to a Treasury regulation because of two
recognized exceptions to Chevron: (1) the agency lacked expertise in the
particular area83 and (2) absent clear indication in the statute, courts presume
that Congress did not intend to delegate to agencies matters of deep
economic or social significance fundamental to the statutory regime.84
Depending on how their contours are defined in future cases, both
exceptions have the potential to significantly limit the ambit of Chevron.
And the common law task of forging new exceptions to deference
doctrine continues. For example, one recent circuit court case questioned
whether Chevron could apply to an excise tax regulation absence evidence

77. Implementation of the Fair Hous. Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460
(Feb.15,2013).
78. Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
79. Id. at 2542-43 (Alito, J ., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2525 (''The Court holds that [the requirements of the HUD regulation] are cognizable
under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results·oriented language, the Court's interpretation
of similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress' ratification . . . , and the statutory
purpose.").
81. See supra text accompanying notes 24 to 29.
82. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
83. Id. at 2489 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,266--67 (2006)).
84. Id. (citing Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) and FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)); see Abigail R. Moncrieff,
Reincarnating the "Major Questio1111" Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of
Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 593 (2008).
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that Treasury had taken into consideration the interpretational principle
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law .85 Given the plethora of
canons of construction littering the landscape, this sort of approach could
have major implications if it becomes popular.
Similarly, another post-Mayo tax case limited Brand X deference. In the
Home Concrete case in 2012, the Supreme Court invalidated a Treasury
regulation involving the extended statute of limitations on assessment
provided by I.R.C. § 650l(e).86 Although Brand X had held that Chevronqualified regulations can trump judicial precedents, the plurality in Home
Concrete held that a decision preceding the regulation had so narrowed the
interpretational space that there was no statutory gap for Treasury to fill via
regulation."
3. Conflating Chevron and Other Standards
Chevron can continue to be cited but be deprived of generative power if
it is collapsed into or merged with other doctrines. This appears to be
occurring. First, I and others have argued that step one logically is
subsumed in step two, reducing Chevron to a simple reasonableness test."
Some case law support for this approach is emerging." Similarly, an
increasing number of cases are conflating Chevron's step two with arbitraryand-capricious analysis under the APA.90

4. Applying the Standard Non-Deferentially
Doctrines of law always have two aspects: their verbal formulation and
the spirit in which they are applied. Of the two, the latter is far more
important to the outcomes of controversies. The spirit in which Chevron is
applied has changed. Chevron originally was indulgent and friendly towards
85. Validus Reinsurance, Ltd. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (dictum).
86. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,LLC, 132 S. Ct.1836 (2012).
87. Id. at 1842-44. For discussion of Home Concrete, see Steve R. Johnson, Reflections on
Home Concrete: Writing Tax Regulations and Interpreting Tax Statutes, 13 FLA. ST. U. Bus. REV.
77 (2014).
88. E.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 284-85; Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron
Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).
89. E.g .• Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-11 (2015) (invalidating a regulation aa being
an unreasonable interpretation of the statute without locating its analysis under either step one or
step two); Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2442-49 (ruling similar to Michigan); Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct.
at 1846 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("'Step 1' has never been an essential part of Chevron analysis.'').
90. E.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706--07; Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817,
826 (2013); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011). For discussion of judicial review
under the arbitrary-and--capricious standard, see Mark Seidenfeld, The l"elevance of Politics for
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REY. 141 (2012).
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agency action, and it is still spoken of that way by some.91 But that
characterization often is no longer accurate. Now, many cases are applying
Chevron in a searching, rigorous fashion, converting it from a shield to
protect agency actions into a sword with which to assail them.92
This is evident in City of Arlington, a 2013 Chevron case in which the
Court instructed: "No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces
when confronted with an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers is
always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its
statutory authority."" The Court urged judges to "tak[e] seriously, and
apply[] rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies' authority."94
This rigor was in display in the 2014 Utility Air case in which the Court,
citing City of Arlington, invalidated a non-tax regulation." In tax, it also
was evident in the widely discussed Loving" and Ridgely97 cases
invalidating Treasury regulations governing practice before the IRS ,98 and in
the Supreme Court's 2015 state tax Brohl case.99
CONCLUSION

We have seen the rise of Chevron in tax, culminating in Mayo in 2011,
and its fall in tax and elsewhere; a fall in substantive significance, although
perhaps not frequency of citation. We have located the causes of the fall in
Chevron's own inconsistencies and inadequate conceptualization. And, we
have sketched the forms the downgrading of Chevron's significance have
taken in recent cases .100

Has this all been wasted judicial effort going around in a doctrinal
circle? Does it leave us in the same place we were before Chevron was
91. E.g.,Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
92. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Re'tum
Preparation, 59 VnL. L.REV. 515, 528--29 (2014); Executive Board, supra note 59, at 239 ("Many
modern scholars conclude that contrary to the view that Chevron mandated deference . . . , it has in
fact given the judiciary additional power to determine the legitimacy of agency rolemaking.").
93. City of Arlingtoo v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
94. Id. at 1874.
95. Util.AirRegulatoryGrp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442-49 (2014).
96. Lovingv. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d67 (DD.C. 2013),aff'd, 742F.3d 1013 (D.C. CU. 2014).
97. Ridgely v. Lew, 55 F. Supp. 3d 89 (D.D.C. 2014).
98. For discussion of these cases, see Steve R. Johnson, How Far Does Circular 230 Exceed
Treasury's Statutory Amhority?, 146 TAX NOTES 221 (Jan. 12, 2015).
99. Direct Mktg. ABs'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015); see Steve R. Jobnson, How Would the
Supreme Court Decide Loving and Ridgely?, 147 TAX NOTES 559,561-63 (May 4,2015).
100. Not all agree with my description of the trajectory. Some maintain that Chevron is merely
evolving, not diminishing. E.g., Executive Board, supra note 59, at 240. This is hardly surprising.
The history of Chevron has been marked by disagreement and "consistent shifts in ... scholarship."
Id. at235.
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handed down, with no recompense for the journey? No. We are better off in
two ways. First, despite a few whose conversion remains in the future, the
center of gravity of the tax community now understands that returning to the
cloister of tax parochialism is not an option.
Second, both in tax and other areas, jurists and commentators find it
increasingly difficult to ignore or paper over the serious flaws of Chevron.
Adopting a wider angle of vision, we see that the flaws are not those of
Chevron alone. They infect deference doctrine generally 101 and are the rot at
the core of the separation of powers doctrine on which general
administrative law is based. Seeing that more clearly, ours will be the
opportunity and the obligation to mend these rents in the fabric of American
law.

101. Thus, concurrent with the assault on Chevron is growing uneasiness about the doctrine
granting great deference to agencies' interpretation of their own ambiguous regulatioll8. E.g.,
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338-39 (Roberts, CJ., concurring) & id. at 133944 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). This uneasiness will eventually lead, I
believe, to abrogation of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). See Steve R. Johnson, Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax
Court, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2013); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's
Domain, 79 GEO. WASH.L.REv.1449 (2011).
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